

IAC-D-100/53
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Validity Study of NIE 31-57:

Yugoslavia's Policies and Prospects,

published 11 June 1957 *

1. Some of the conclusions in NIE 31-57 now appear to have been at least partly in error. The estimate was published just prior to the ouster of Tito's enemy in the Kremlin, Molotov, and was written for the most part during the period of strained Soviet-Yugoslav relations which followed the Hungarian revolt; many basic Yugoslav attitudes concerning the USSR were submerged during that period. Moreover, at the time of NIE 31-57's publication, intelligence concerning Yugoslav foreign policies was scantier than at present; and the implications of the October events in Eastern Europe and the resultant Soviet-Yugoslav polemics loomed larger in June 1957 than they do at present. At any rate, the rapid improvement in Yugoslav-Soviet relations during the summer and fall of 1957 was not foreseen in the June estimate.

2. In general, the estimate revealed a tendency to under-rate the basic Yugoslav desire for rapprochement with Bloc countries; it did not fully assess the long-run impact of the Hungarian revolt on the Yugoslav attitude toward Eastern Europe (resulting in Belgrade's desire for slow change and stability in the area); and it reflected a wrong assessment of the Yugoslav estimate of Soviet and Western intentions.

* This validity study is restricted to those portions of NIE 31-57 which dealt with Yugoslavia's external affairs. A validity study of the estimate's conclusions concerning internal affairs will follow the next general estimate on Yugoslavia.

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